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FOREWORD:

A SYMPOSIUM ON THE

JURISPRUDENCE OF

H.L.A.

HART

George A. Martinez*

HL.A.

Hart is widely regarded as the premier legal philosopher of

this century. As this century draws to a close, it seems appropriate to reconsider Hart's work. Accordingly, in order to assess
the continuing significance of Hart's philosophy, the SMU Law Review
offers this symposium issue. Authored by a group of distinguished philosophers of law, the articles contained in this issue constitute important
contributions to the field of jurisprudence. They conclusively demonstrate that Hart's legal philosophy continues to lie at the very center of
contemporary legal theory.
In his contribution, Law As Experience: Theory and the InternalAspect
of Law,1 Thomas Morawetz analyzes Hart's notion of "the internal aspect
of rules."' 2 In explicating Hart's distinction between the internal and external aspects of law, he reveals its importance for contemporary jurisprudence. In particular, he argues that there is a close connection between
the external perspective of "jurisprudential theory and the internal aspect
of legal practices."' 3 Thus, he rejects the views of legal theorists who fail
to recognize the significance of the internal point of view.
In Explicating the Internal Point of View, 4 Dennis Patterson observes
that Hart's major work, The Concept of Law, 5 was written during a period when philosophy had begun to focus on the analysis of language.
That focus on language led Hart to ask "What, if anything, makes a proposition 'legal' and not a proposition of some other sort (e.g. moral)."'6 He
concludes that Hart was correct to analyze language in seeking "the uni'7
queness of law."
In Finding Wittgenstein at the Core of the Rule of Recognition,8
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Anthony Sebok explores how Hart's theory of judicial discretion is related to his positivistic conception of law. He argues that Hart's notion of
discretion makes sense only in the context of Hart's distinction between
primary and secondary rules. In particular, he contends that the secondary rules operate to constrain the exercise of judicial discretion.
The next article is Hart, Fuller,Dworkin, and Fragile Norms9 by Joseph
Mendola. In this piece, Mendola revisits Hart's famous debate with Lon
Fuller regarding the relationship between law and morality. He concludes that Fuller's position is stronger than many have thought.
In Logic, Intuition, and the Positivist Legacy of H.L.A. Hart,'0 Douglas
Lind considers Hart's contributions to the question of whether judicial
decision making is based on reason or intuition. In this regard, he points
out that Hart viewed logic as a fundamental aspect of adjudication.
In H.L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal Theory, 1 Brian Bix
explains the genesis of Hart's notion of the internal perspective on law.
Bix also considers how subsequent legal philosophers have critiqued and
refined Hart's internalist position.
Finally, in Legality and Morality in H.L.A. Hart's Theory of Criminal
Law,' 2 Hamish Stewart turns his attention to Hart's work in the area of
criminal law. He argues that Hart's analysis of the criminal law undermines Hart's jurisprudential claim that there is a separation between law
and morality.
Professor Morawetz is surely correct when he observes that Hart "is no
longer our contemporary. "13 The articles in this symposium issue, however, clearly show that Hart's jurisprudential insights are of continuing
significance.
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